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A REPRISE OF WARRANTS, PROBABLE CAUSE, AND ARTIC-
ULABLE SUSPICION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT-
LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
Illegal immigration, especially of Mexican citizens, poses a serious
national problem. 1 It presents a particular challenge to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the agency charged with enforcing federal
regulations concerning aliens. 2 Although the INS has employed a variety of
enforcement techniques, 3 its methods have had only limited impact on the
numbers of unauthorized aliens in the United States.
4
Yet, neither the magnitude of the problem, nor the singular lack of
success by the INS has prevented criticism that the agency's ends do not
justify its means. Critics charge that in its zeal to exclude illegal aliens the
INS employs methods that violate the fourth amendment. 5 Many commen-
tators deplore INS techniques which permit seizures of nonwhite and non-
English-speaking citizens or lawfully present aliens without warrants,
probable cause, or articulable suspicion of illegal alienage. 6 Courts, they
argue, should prohibit the INS from employing these methods. 7
1. Catz, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Nonborder Searches for Illegal Aliens: The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service Meets the Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.L 66, 66-67 (1978).
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
3. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (factory sweep);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411(1981) (roving patrol stop); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (stationary checkpoint); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving
patrol stop); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (farm check); Illinois Migrant Council v.
Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) (farm check), modified on reh'g en banc as to remedy only, 548
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. Catz, supra note 1, at 67.
5. The traditional interpretation of the fourth amendment has required a warrant for every search or
seizure and probable cause for the issuance of any warrant. See Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257,258 (1984); Project, Investigation andPolicePractice,
72 GEo. L.J. 253,261-66 (1983). See also Catz, supra note 1, at 67 (manner in which the INS employs
some enforcement techniques, including factory sweeps, farm checks, and random street interroga-
tions, violates the fourth amendment); Note, Constitutional Law-INS Raids on Garment Factories-
The Fourth Amendment and Expediency, 18 CRiGroTON L. REv. 151, 151-53 (1984) (manner in which
INS conducts work sweeps violates the fourth amendment) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional
Law]; Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado: Factory Raids: Seizure or Brief
Encounter?, 18 J. MAR. L. REv. 509, 510-511 & n. 12, 518 (1985) (INS practice of conducting work
sweeps without warrants or specific articulable suspicion violates the fourth amendment) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Delgado].
6. See Catz, supra note 1, at 67-68; Developments in the Law- Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1374 (1983); Comment, INS Surveys of Business Establishments:
Reasonable, Individualized Suspicion ofIllegal Alienage, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 632, 667 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Comment, INS Surveys].
7. See, e.g., Catz, supra note 1, at 67-68; The Requirement of Individualized Suspicion: An End to
INS Factory Sweeps?, 59 CHI.[-]KENr L. REv. 1069, 1093 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Factory Sweeps];
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This position, however, is contrary to that adopted by the Supreme Court
in some of its recent decisions. 8 In those decisions, the Court interpreted
the fourth amendment in a manner that would sanction certain searches and
seizures without warrants, probable cause, or articulable suspicion so long
as such searches and seizures could be considered "reasonable." 9 The
Court determined "reasonableness" by balancing the government's inter-
est in employing a particular law enforcement technique against the indi-
vidual's interest in privacy. 10 The Court's decisions have not prevented the
Ninth Circuit from announcing that, under some circumstances, the INS
must continue to possess either warrants, probable cause, or articulable
suspicion of illegal alienage before searches or detentions of individuals. I I
This Note analyzes LaDuke v. Nelson, 12 in which the Ninth Circuit held
that the farm and ranch check practices of the INS violated the fourth
amendment in that seizures were made without warrants, probable cause,
or articulable suspicion of illegal alienage. 13 The court's alternative hold-
ing criticized the INS for conducting searches without warrants, probable
cause, or effective consent. 14 For LaDuke to stand it must be carefully
distinguished from the Supreme Court's most recent fourth amendment
decisions, which juxtapose the individual's interest in privacy and security
with the government's interest in effective law enforcement.
LaDuke should stand because it provides an appropriate standard for
cases which involve searches and seizures for the purpose of apprehending
farm workers who are illegal aliens. 15 That standard prevents the INS from
Note. Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 190; Note, Delgado, supra note 5, at 523; Note, Search and
Seizure-Immigration-INS Factory Surveys Do Not Violate Fourth Amendment, 15 SETON HALL L. REV.
397, 420-21 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Search and Seizure].
8. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210-221; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543-567. See also Aliens-
Fourth Amendment-Examining the Validity of Questioning and Detaining Workers During INS Opera-
tions, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 449, 460 (1983).
9. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562. See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221-22 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 561-62 (1978) (adoption of "reasonableness"
standard for searches); wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 264.
10. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62; wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 264.
11. See Laduke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
12. 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 1327-1328.
14. Id. at 1321, 1329-30.
15. The LaDuke standard assists the INS in resolving one element of the illegal immigration
problem: the location and deportation of illegal aliens. To be successful in its fight against illegal
immigration, the INS must address the second element of the problem--deterrence of potential illegal
immigrants. The most effective means of resolving that element, without correspondingly jeopardizing
the rights of citizens or lawfully-present aliens, is to levy penalties upon the employers of illegal aliens
in the form of fines or confiscation. In the face of severe penalties, few employers would choose to hire
illegal aliens. Since the economic opportunities available in the United States attract most illegal aliens,
job scarcity would serve as a powerful disincentive. See Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 190;
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harassing citizens and lawfully present aliens based on their racial or ethnic
characteristics. It also prohibits the INS from harassing citizens and legal
aliens based on their presumed proximity to illegal aliens. 16
I. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Development of Immigration Law
Immigration law in the United States emerged in the late nineteenth an
early twentieth centuries as a means of controlling the ethnic, cultural, and
class composition of the immigrant population;17 promoting nationalism;'
8
and fostering sovereignty.' 9 The development of this body of law coincided
with the political realization that the United States no longer needed
immigrants as a source of labor and as a means of enhancing property
values. 20 After the transition from open to limited immigration, the number
of foreign nationals seeking entrance to the United States exceeded the
Note, Delgado, supra note 5, at 522 & n.99, 523; Comment, INS Surveys, supra note 6, at 670.
Bills have been introduced by both houses of Congress to fine employers convicted of hiring
unauthorized aliens. See, e.g., S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). At least one bill tied an employer
penalty provision to a provision for asylum for some illegal aliens. See S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). See also Mailman, Immigration Law, 187 N.Y.L.J. 70 (1982), at 1, col. 1; Seattle Times/Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, February 16, 1986, at B8, col. 1.
A confiscation scheme is already in place for persons who bring in and harbor illegal aliens. Such a
scheme may be extended to employers. In that case the INS would need to define seizable property (i.e.,
the farm, equipment, other assets). See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982).
Thus far, Congress has not passed suitable enabling legislation, perhaps because some commentators
and ethnic lobby groups object to this legislation on the grounds that such a law might encourage
discrimination in employment against persons of foreign ancestry. Comment, INS Surveys, supra note
6, at 671.
16. See generally Catz, supra note 1, (INS violates the fourth amendment in the manner in which it
enforces immigration laws); Wasserstrom, supra note 5 (protesting curtailment of fourth amendment
rights by the Burger Court).
17. New immigrants, who hailed from places other than Northern and Western Europe, triggered
"racial and religious prejudice, fears of revolutionary contagion, class conflict, and other deep-seated
animosities." Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 5 (1984). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1952).
18. Schuck, supra note 17, at 6.
19. The Supreme Court of that era accepted the classical idea of sovereignty, which implied a
relationship between government and alien that resembled the relationship between landowner and
trespasser. Schuck, supra note 17, at 6-7. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), the
Court stated that every sovereign nation has the right, as a measure of its sovereignty, to control
immigration by whatever measures it deems apt. Thus, control over the admission of strangers was
viewed as a powerful expression of the nation's identity and autonomy. Schuck, supra note 17, at 6-7.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1365 at 6.
20. Compare with the statement "[a]nxious to attract labor and enhance property values, the
colonies actively and imaginatively promoted immigration by Europeans." Schuck, supra note 17, at 8.
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number that the United States was willing to accept. 21 Thus, a number of
particularly determined aliens have chosen to defy restrictions and to enter
illegally. 22 These trespassers are creating an increasing problem, albeit one
overlooked for many years. 23
Courts and commentators estimate that from one to twelve million
illegal aliens live within the United States. 24 Most illegal aliens hail from
Mexico. 25 They come principally for the significantly greater economic
opportunities available in the United States. 26 Thus far, the INS has found it
impossible to prevent illegal crossings along the 2000-mile border between
the United States and Mexico, 27 although it has employed a variety of
methods 28 to discourage unlawful entries. The public has developed a keen
interest in the control of this influx, 29 believing illegal aliens cause a variety
of problems30 that impinge on the public's welfare. On the other hand, the
public seeks to avoid law enforcement campaigns that grant officers discre-
tionary power to question individuals about their national origins or their
citizenship status, 31 or to interfere randomly with an individual's daily
travel.32
In 1952 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act 33 (INA) in
an attempt to deal systematically with the flow of illegal aliens. The Act set
forth the requirements for legal immigration, 34 and conferred upon the
21. See Comment, INS Surveys, supra note 6, at 633-34. See also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
551.
22. Catz, supra note 1, at 66 n.I. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (trespassers include not only
those who enter illegally initially, but also those who undergo a change in status as a result of the lapse
of time or the commission of a prohibited act).
23. Catz, supra note 1, at 66.
24. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring) (recent estimates range from two to twelve
million, although many experts pin the number at closer to three to six million aliens at any one time);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (conservative estimate is one million, but
may be as high as ten to twelve million); Catz, supra note 1, at 66 (estimated at millions); Factory
Sweeps, supra note 7, at 1069 (estimated at between three and six million).
25. See Catz, supra note I, at 66 & n.2. See also Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. at 551.
26. Marrinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551.
27. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879.
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
29. Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
30. These problems include the "depression of domestic wages, reduction in the quality of working
conditions, loss of tax revenues, increase in potential health hazards, and generation of animosity by
unemployed citizens and legal aliens toward the illegal aliens." Comment, INS Surveys, supra note 6, at
632, 651.
31. Marquez, 436 F. Supp. at 113.
32. Id.
33. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
34. The primary purpose of the Act was to establish immigration quotas for the various indepen-
dent countries of the world. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 2096,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1952). The Act also promulgates rules relating to the entry and exclusion,
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agents of the INS broad power to investigate possible violations. 35 These
powers include the right to question suspected aliens without warrant
regarding their right to be in the country.36 Nevertheless, the INS's author-
ity to detain and question individuals under the INA has been interpreted
consistently by the courts to be subject to fourth amendment require-
ments.37
B. The Fourth Amendment-Traditional and Contemporary
Interpretations
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. " 38
1. The Traditional Interpretation or Warrant Approach
Although most courts and commentators agree on the motivations that
produced the fourth amendment, 39 they do not agree on a particular
interpretation of its requirements. 40 For approximately thirty years, 41 the
Supreme Court interpreted the fourth amendment to require a warrant for
nearly every search and seizure,42 and probable cause for every warrant. 43
deportation, and registration of aliens. Id. at 14-67.
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1982).
36. Id. § 1357(a).
37. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272(1973); Babula v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 665 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
38. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The intent of this provision was to outlaw writs of assistance and
general warrants. Writs of assistance allowed officers of th6 Crown to search where they pleased for
goods imported in violation of British tax laws. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). General
warrants granted the state broad powers to search, apprehend, and seize citizens without any par-
ticularity. Id. at 483-84. In contrast, law enforcement agents were prohibited from conducting general
searches or "fishing expeditions" under the Constitution. Id. at 485. Nor could they seize one item
under a warrant describing a wholly different item. Id.
39. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980); Stanford, 379 U.S. at 481-84; Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1958).
40. See Wasserstrom, supra note 5, passim.
41. Id. at 273.
42. One of the first judicially recognized exceptions to the warrant/probable cause requirement was
the "stop and frisk" procedure authorized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court held
that an officer investigating a possibly armed individual's suspicious behavior could detain the
individual and conduct a cursory search for weapons. Id. at 24. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40-46 (1968); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 264.
43. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 258-59.
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During that period, the Court broadened the definition of a search, 44 and
defined seizures to include the exercise by police of even the most mini-
mally coercive restraint over individuals. 45 In determining the legality of a
seizure under this approach, the Court would look generally for police
possession of a warrant, probable cause, or articulable suspicion. 46 In a
similar manner, the Court sanctioned seizures if law enforcement agents
possessed warrants, probable cause, or consent. 47
The effect of this interpretation on immigration law can best be demon-
strated by the Court's decisions in United States v. Ortiz 48and Alneida-
Sanchez v. United States.49 In Ortiz,50 the Supreme Court rejected the
government's contention that a search at a temporary checkpoint was
neither highly discretionary nor intrusive. 5 1 First, the Court held that the
search pattern permitted officers too much discretion, since they searched
no more than ten percent of the passing cars. 52 Second, the Court found that
the search constituted a substantial invasion of privacy, even though the
search took place in the driver's automobile, and not his residence. 53
Accordingly, the Court found that the INS violated the fourth amendment,
since the officers had neither a warrant, consent, nor probable cause to
conduct a search. 54 The Court specifically rejected the government's con-
tentions that the nation's interest in controlling illegal immigration and the
practical difficulties of policing the Mexican border outweighed the privacy
interests of individuals. 55
44. Searches encompassed even non-trespassory invasions of privacy by wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance. Id.
45. Id.
46. Articulable suspicion is an objectively based determination containing two elements: (1) an
assessment of all the circumstances, and (2) a suspicion, based on the assessment, that a particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
47. Exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to arrest, searches compelled
by an exigency (the emergency doctrine), and searches authorized by consent. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4. 1(a) (1978).
48. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
49. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
50. In Ortiz, the INS's Border Patrol officers stopped a driver for a routine immigration search at a
traffic checkpoint 62 miles from the border and found three aliens concealed in the trunk of the car.
Based on this discovery, the driver was convicted of knowingly transporting illegal aliens. 422 U.S. at
892.
51. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894-95.
52. Id. at 896.
53. Id. at 896 & n.2.
54. Id. at 896-97.
55. Id. at 892. The Court cited with approval its decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973). In that decision the Court held that the government's strong interest in controlling
immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the Mexican border did not justify dispensing with
both warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving patrols near the border. Id. at 273.
1258
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The Court reached a similar result in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States.56 There, Border Patrol agents had neither a search warrant, probable
cause to stop or search, nor reasonable suspicion for detention. 57 Although
the government argued that the INA58 authorized it to conduct warrantless
searches without probable cause, the Court disagreed. 59 The Court refused
to weigh the government's need to deter unlawful entry by aliens against the
privacy rights of the individual.60 Indeed, the Court indicated that it would
be unreasonable for government agents to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding illegal aliens, since such a practice would subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of a
search. 61
2. The Contemporary Interpretation or Balancing Approach
Recently, without overruling previous decisions, the Supreme Court
enlarged the traditional number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. 62
In doing so, it appeared to revert to an older interpretation 63 of the fourth
amendment which required warrants or probable cause only for technical
arrests and exhaustive searches. 64 Detentions and searches65 short of these
were prohibited only if unreasonable. 66 This interpretation allows the Court
to exempt a variety of intrusive police practices from traditional fourth
amendment and Terry requirements. 67 Specifically, the Court can use the
56. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen who held a valid United States
work permit was stopped by the INS's Border Patrol on a highway about 25 miles north of the Mexican
border. During a search of his car, agents found marihuana. He was convicted subsequently of
transporting it. Id. at 267.
57. Id. at 268.
58. The INA provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a
reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3).
59. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
60. Id. at 273-74.
61. The Court cited with approval the reasoning of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in
which the Court held that it was unacceptable to subject every vehicle to a search on the chance of
finding contraband in some vehicles. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 274.
62. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 263-64.
63. This interpretation predated the Court's "traditional interpretation." Id. at 273.
64. Id. at 266.
65. Although consent is still a valid basis for a legal search, it is unclear, after the Burger Court
fourth amendment cases, to what extent ihe Court requires probable cause or warrants for legal
searches. See LaFave, infra note 131. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,505 n. 10 (1983) (Court
indicates that the least permissible basis for a legal search is articulable suspicion).
66. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 266.
67. The traditional requirement is a warrant or probable cause. See supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text. The Terry requirement prohibits even brief seizures and cursory searches (stop and frisk
maneuvers) unless an officer is able to point to specific facts that give rise to articulable suspicion of
1259
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standard of general reasonableness, which balances the individual's inter-
est in privacy against society's interest in preventing and detecting crime, to
determine the legality of questioned police practices. 68 This standard is less
rigorous than the traditional warrant approach.
This change from a warrant approach to a balancing approach is ex-
emplified in the area of immigration law by the cases of United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte69 and Immigration & Naturalization Service v. De-
lgado.70 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,71 the Court balanced the law
enforcement interests of the government against the privacy interests of
citizens to determine the appropriateness of the INS's conduct under the
fourth amendment. 72 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that
border checkpoint stops were seizures, 73 it determined that the fourth
amendment did not require even articulable suspicion for such stops. 74 The
Court indicated that while the respondents were entitled to some expecta-
tion of privacy in their automobiles,75 their expectations were less compel-
ling than the government's need for this particular enforcement tech-
nique.76
Although the Court found it unnecessary to apply the balancing ap-
proach in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado,77 the tone78 of
the majority and concurring opinions suggests that the Court would have
employed that standard, if required. 79 In Delgado, the Supreme Court
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1968).
In contrast, the contemporary interpretation validates some searches and detentions which tradi-
tionally would have required warrants or probable cause if the searches and detentions can be classified
as "reasonable." Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 264.
68. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 264.
69. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
70. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). The Court addressed the seizure issue in Martinez-Fuerre. In Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the Court examined a search to determine if it met constitutional
requirements under the contemporary interpretation of the fourth amendment.
71. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
72. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556. The agents of the INS arrested the respondents in Martinez-
Fuerte after questioning them at permanent checkpoints located on a major highway away from the
Mexican border, and charged them with transporting illegal aliens. Id. at 545.
73. Id. at 556.
74. Id. at 562. Articulable suspicion is the Terry requirement. See supra notes 42 & 67.
75. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 561.
76. Id. at 562.
77. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). Since the Court did not find a seizure and agents possessed a search
warrant for the premises, the Court found it unnecessary to employ the contemporary interpretation of
the fourth amendment. Id. at 212, 215-21.
78. Although the Burger Court did not use a balancing approach to determine fourth amendment
violations in Delgado, it required a greater degree of detention for a finding of a seizure than that
required under the traditional approach. Id. at 226-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. The author of that decision, Justice Rehnquist, is the chief advocate of the contemporary
interpretation or the "reasonableness" approach. See Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 273. See also
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221-24 (Powell, J., concurring).
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determined that the INS practice of stationing agents at the factory exits to
prevent departures, while deploying others to question workers about their
identities and citizenship, 80 resulted in neither a seizure of the workforce
nor a seizure of any individual respondent. 81 This determination rested
partly on the Court's finding that work obligations more than the INS
activities limited the employees' freedom to move about.82 Thus, the Court
replaced the Ninth Circuit's summary judgment with one of its own. 83
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that even if the conduct of
the INS constituted a seizure, it was reasonable and permissible under the
fourth amendment. 84 His analysis parallelled that of the Court in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte,85 finding the employees' expectation of privacy
in the workplace to be outweighed by the government's interest in using
factory surveys to curtail illegal immigration. 86 It is unclear to what extent
the holding in Martinez-Fuerte and the concurring opinion in Delgado will
be employed to expand the Delgado holding to other factual situations. 87
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan advocated the traditional inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment. 88 He found that the practices of the INS
during these worksite surveys constituted such a show of authority that
individual workers were "seized." ' 89 Such seizures, although brief, are
illegal under the fourth amendment because they are not based on articula-
ble suspicion of illegal alienage. 90
The standards in Martinez-Fuerte and Delgado differ markedly from
those in the Court's decisions in the earlier cases of Ortiz,91 and Almeida-
Sanchez.92 Although the Court's opinions in both cases indicate that the
decisions do no more than follow the earlier precedents, neither the type of
enforcement activity nor the agents' degree of discretion justify the dif-
ferent outcomes. Only a change in the Court's interpretation of the fourth
80. Agents could be identified readily as law enforcement officers since they displayed badges,
were armed, and carried walkie-talkies. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
81. Id. at 219-21. The Court found no seizure despite the fact that the admitted purpose of the INS
in sealing the factory exits was to prevent employees from leaving during the survey. See Note,
Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 173.
82. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
83. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
86. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 223-24 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. This is the issue confronted in LaDuke. See infra note 93.
88. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 233-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
92. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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amendment can account for the results. On the heels of Delgado came the
Ninth Circuit decision in LaDuke v. Nelson,93 which appears to hark back
to the pre-Martinez-Fuerte analysis of the fourth amendment.
II. THE LADUKE v. NELSON DECISION
A. Facts of the Case
In 1977 three United States citizens, as representatives of a class of farm
labor residents, sought an injunction prohibiting INS officials from enter-
ing farm labor housing without valid search or arrest warrants on the
grounds that such entry violated the fourth amendment. 94 Specifically, they
alleged that the INS agents in the Spokane sector95 routinely conducted
warrantless surprise searches in farm camps 96 on the basis of anonymous
telephone tips, previous apprehensions of illegal aliens in an area, or the
chance proximity of agents in an area. 97 The searches were conducted by
uniformed officers carrying handcuffs, guns, and flashlights. 98 The officers
attempted to seal off exit roads before beginning a systematic interrogation
of all residents concerning the citizenship status of those in the camp. 99
Those individuals who responded to knocks on doors were questioned in
English. 100 If the INS agents believed that the person who answered was an
alien or if they thought aliens were present inside the dwelling, they would
ask for permission to enter the dwelling, and search for and interrogate all
occupants. 101 Residents were not advised of their right to refuse the officers
entry. 10 2 Other officers apprehended, detained, and interrogated anyone
who attempted to leave from the rear or side of units. 10 3 The officers
arrested those believed to be illegal aliens. 104
93. 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
94. LaDuke v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E.D. Wash. 1982), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.
1985).
95. The Spokane sector is an area composed of eastern Washington, a part of northern Idaho, and a
part of western Montana. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 160.
96. Farmers with crops that require an extensive use of hand labor often provide quarters to
itinerant workers. Id.
97. Id. at 161.
98. Id. at 160.
99. Id.
100. Officers were attempting to determine whether the residents spoke English or had a noticeable
accent. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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B. The Holding of the Court
The district court determined that the plaintiffs' rightto security had
been violated because the plaintiffs were seized without articulable suspi-
cion, or, alternatively, because the plaintiffs' premises were searched
without valid consent.105 The court enjoined the INS from seizing farm
camps or individuals without warrants, probable cause, or articulable
suspicion and from searching farm housing without warrants, probable
cause, or valid consent. 10 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding 0 7 of a mass seizure, 10 8 and its finding that searches took place
without valid consent. 109 Moreover, the LaDuke court held that Delgado
strengthened the validity of the district court's seizure conclusion, 110
despite Delgado's reversal of a similar, although not identical, mass seizure
holding. I ' The LaDuke court based its determination on two factors.
First, the LaDuke court perceived that, unlike the agents in Delgado,
LaDuke agents failed to obtain warrants or the consent of the farm or ranch
105. Id. at 162-63. The district court determined that entire farm labor housing communities were
seized en masse. It also indicated that INS had failed to prove that housing residents consented to
searches without duress or coercion. Id. at 163.
106. Id. at 165 & n.1. The district court in deciding for the plaintiffs noted that:
(1) the Attorney General had directed the INS to restrict searches of residences to routine casework or
those authorized by warrant or court order in 1981;
(2) the Chief Border Patrol Agent for the Spokane Sector had issued a memorandum which permitted
farm and ranch checks in cities and towns to be conducted only under the authority of a court order or
warrant, but allowed farm and ranch checks at the place of employment when knowing consent to enter
had been given;
(3) the behavior of the INS agents in approaching the housing units during early morning or late
evening hours with emergency vehicles and flashing lights constituted a seizure since a "reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave;"
(4) the disparity of power, cultural differences, and the limited educations and linguistic abilities of
the largely Mexican residents argued against the INS's contention that its agents received voluntary
consent; and
(5) anonymous telephone calls, the previous presence of illegal aliens, or the proximity of agents to
housing areas did not constitute the individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure.
Id. at 163-64.
107. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326-30. The Ninth Circuit's precise holding is difficult to extract from
the language of the opinion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the court below, and seemed to
apply the same fourth amendment requirements as those employed by the district court. Those
requirements were: (1) warrants, probable cause, or articulable suspicion for seizures, and (2) warrants,
probable cause, or consent for searches.
108. "Looking at the entire record, especially the findings that the access roads were sealed, the
means of egress from the individual units were surrounded and those who left were seized, we affirm the
district court's conclusion that a seizure of the entire unit is routinely accomplished." Id. at 1328.
109. The court observed that factors, identical or similar to those employed by the district court to
reach its invalid consent holding, had been found to be probative of voluntariness of consent in other
cases. Those factors include minimal schooling, lack of business sophistication, lack of fluency in
English, a show of force by armed officers, and a display of authority. Id. at 1329.
110. Id.at 1328.
11I. Id. See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219.
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owners to enter, as would be required if the farm and ranch housing units
were, as the INS insisted, parts of the workplace.11 2 If the housing units
were not part of the workplace,11 3 the LaDuke workers were entitled to a
level of privacy equivalent to that accorded to residents of other types of
dwellings and the INS would be required to obtain search warrants or the
consent of the housing occupants in order to have access. 114
The LaDuke court upheld the lower court's ruling that any consent given
by the occupants of farm and ranch units was involuntary. 115 The court
noted several factors that argued against a finding of voluntary consent,
including (1) the intimidating nature of the INS farm and ranch check
practices, 116 (2) the disparity of power between the housing occupants and
the INS agents, 17 (3) the timing of the checks in the early morning or late
evening, 118 (4) "the inherent fear that residents of the camp have of officers
112. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1328. See also LaFave, supra note 47, at § 6.1(a), 379-80 (warrant
required to enter the premises of a third party to arrest other individuals).
113. By alleging that they sought the consent of occupants rather than that of the owners to enter,
INS implied that the units were not part of the workplace. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1328.
114. Id. The court noted that the INS did not offer an explanation as to why it required warrants for
urban searches but none for rural searches.
These ranch checks are not border area searches and the INS has not contended that these area
control operations are conducted under its border control authority. Moreover, the Fourth Amend-
ment does not permit the INS to differentiate on a per se basis in the privacy accorded different
stocks of housing. Without question, the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the resi-
dent's, not the INS's expectation of privacy.
Id. at 1326 & n.ll. See also id. at 1328-29.
115. Id. at 1329. In finding that the INS did not meet its burden of proving consent, the court
indicated that the record demonstrated "no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority". Id.
(quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.543, 548-49 (1968)). According to the court, "[tihe
atmosphere surrounding the INS's standard farm check practices depicts a substantial show of official
force." LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1330.
The Delgado Court specifically rejected the premise that a law enforcement officer's failure to inform
persons of their right not to respond to questions negated the consensual nature of the responses. "While
most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told
they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response." Delgado, 466
U.S. at 216.
By contrast, the LaDuke court partially based its determination that the searches were involuntary on
the finding that agents failed to inform residents of their right not to answer questions. LaDuke, 762 F.2d
at 1329. The court also considered social factors in deciding this issue. Id. The Supreme Court,
however, in a relatively recent decision, did not consider social factors dispositive of the consent issue.
The Court held that an individual's race, youthfulness, fear, and lack of schooling were relevant, but not
decisive on the issue of voluntary consent. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,558 (1980); see
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Since the LaDuke court's ineffective
consent determination rested on a number of elements, the inapplicability of a particular factor would
be insufficient to label the court's holding erroneous.
116. LaDuke. 762 F.2d at 1330 ("a substantial show of official force").
117. Id. at 1329.
118. Id.
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because of their Mexican heritage,"' 19 and (5) the limited linguistic abil-
ities and educational backgrounds of the residents. 120
Second, the court noted that the facts in LaDuke justified a different
outcome because the INS farm and ranch checks customarily involved a
substantial show of official force at the workers' residences. 121 This con-
stituted a greater intrusion than the detention and questioning in the
workplace found to be permissible in Delgado. 122
III. ANALYSIS
A. LaDuke Can Coexist with Delgado
LaDuke does not follow inexorably from Delgado; yet, a harmonious
coexistence is possible. By carefully distinguishing the LaDuke facts from
those in Delgado, the LaDuke court overcame the initial barriers that would
prevent a determination of an illegal search and seizure. Once that was
accomplished, the court quickly aligned the LaDuke decision with pre-
vious cases requiring warrants, probable cause, and articulable suspicion
for seizures, and warrants, probable cause, and consent for searches.
As the LaDuke court indicated, several key factors distinguish LaDuke
from Delgado and suggest a different result. A key distinguishing factor is
the manner in which the cases were resolved. The LaDuke court made its
decision after a trial on the merits. 123 In Delgado, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the INS with a
summary judgment in favor of the Delgado plaintiffs. ' 24 On appeal, this
required the Supreme Court to resolve all issues of fact in the agency's
favor. Such facts included the extent and intrusiveness of the raid. Thus, the
Court's characterization of the INS practice of sealing off the factory exits
as a non-threatening interrogation device, rather than detention, was in
keeping with appellate review requirements. 125 This characterization in
turn allowed the Court to conclude that the conduct of the INS was not
sufficiently intimidating to amount to a fourth amendment seizure,1 26
119. Id. The Ninth Circuit branded this factor a questionable stereotype. Id. at 1329 & n.16.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1330.
122. Id. Thus, while agents are allowed to question residents at their doorsteps, as the agents in
Delgado were allowed to question workers at their work stations, agents are not permitted to detain
occupants who choose to leave farm housing unless the agents possess articulable suspicion of-illegal
alienage, probable cause, or a warrant. This differs from the Delgado Court approach. There the Court
held that if it were permissible to question workers in the interior of the factory, it was no less
permissible to question them at the exits. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
123. LaDuke, 560 F Supp. at 159.
124. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 218-19.
126. Id. at 219.
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despite the INS's acknowledgement that its objective was to prevent work-
ers from leaving the premises. 127 The LaDuke court, on the other hand, did
not operate under any such constraint. After weighing the testimony of the
plaintiffs and the government, it was free to conclude that the INS's
practice of sealing off individual housing exits and camp exits resulted in a
mass seizure. 128
127. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 634 (9th Cir.
1982). rev'd sub nom.. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
128. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1328. Unless Delgado is limited to the narrowest set of facts discernible
in the case, it argues against a mass seizure finding. Even the Delgado dissenters joined with the
majority in dismissing the mass seizure claim in that case because some workers were free to go about
their business normally while the INS's agents questioned others. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 225 & n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
According to the LaDuke district court, officers sealed off roads or paths leading out of the housing
area where possible. This indicates that in some instances egress from individual dwellings was not
impossible. Also, the court indicated that officers proceeded from door to door, interrogating residents
while apprehending, detaining, and interrogating those that exited from the rear or sides of an individual
unit. This implies that residents at other units were free to go about their normal affairs. LaDuke, 560 F.
Supp. at 160.
Since it is possible, arguably, that some farm residents were at liberty to behave normally while the
INS's agents interrogated others, the LaDuke court's mass seizure finding would not be supported by
Delgado. Only a simultaneous and total group detention qualifies for a mass seizure determination
under Delgado. 466 U.S. at 225 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In addition, the Delgado Court would not infer necessarily, as the court in LaDuke may have, that
individual seizures occurred when officers questioned occupants who left from rear and side exits of the
housing units. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion can be deduced from its adoption of the district court's
"standard practices" finding, and its affirmance of the district court's decision to grant injunctive relief.
LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326, 1329, 1333 (standard practices include sealing off roads, stationing officers
at doors and windows of dwellings, and checks during early morning or late evening hours). The
wording of both the standard practices finding and the injunction imply that individual seizures
occurred. The standard practices finding included the following statement:
(o]fficers then proceeded from door to door within the camp, knocking on doors, and interrogating
residents concerning their citizenship status and the status of other persons within the particular
residence and the camp. Occupants who exited from the rear or sides of the units were appre-
hended, detained and interrogated. Those believed to be illegal aliens were arrested.
LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 160.
The injunction issued by the district court enjoins and restrains INS from:
stopping, detaining, and interrogating by force, threats of force or a command based upon official
authority, plaintiffs or persons who reside in farm labor housing unless they possess a valid warrant
to search or arrest such person, have probable cause to search or arrest such person without a
warrant, or have reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts that such person is an
alien unlawfully in the United States.
Id. at 165.The injunction does not bar the INS from conducting interrogations without detention to
determine a person's right to be in the United States if the INS reasonably believes that the person is an
alien. Id.
After establishing the parameters for a seizure, the Delgado Court determined that individual factory
workers were not seized when questioned about their identities, and that the mere possibility of
questioning upon exiting was insufficient to cause a citizen or legal alien to fear seizure or apprehen-
sion. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216,218. The Court implicitly assumed that citizens and legal aliens answer
questions willingly and truthfully, and that they know that their answers will prevent their detention.
The Court considered irrelevant the fact that the INS's agents detained other employees, perhaps illegal
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Still another distinguishing factor is the difference in the agents' autho-
rization to search in LaDuke and Delgado. LaDuke agents acted without
warrants or legally-sufficient consent. 129 Delgado agents obtained warrants
or the consent of factory owners to search. 130 Although law enforcement
interests may justify a warrantless search under selected circumstances, 131
the Supreme Court has implied that the least permissible ground for such a
search is articulable suspicion of illegal conduct.132 The LaDuke court
found that the INS lacked even this minimum. 13 3 Thus, the searches were
unjustified, and, therefore, illegal.
Furthermore, agents in LaDuke invaded residences, not worksites as in
Delgado. 134 The LaDuke agents maintained that farm checks and factory
sweeps were identical; therefore, warrants were unnecessary. 135 This con-
tention raised two issues: (1) whether farm housing could be designated
properly as a worksite; and (2) whether warrants, probable cause, or the
consent of any party was necessary. If farm housing were equivalent to the
factories in Delgado, then Delgado would compel the INS to seek the
consent of the farm owners to protect the owners' right to privacy. 136 Since
aliens, when the employees attempted to flee or evade questioning. Id. The Delgado Court did not
respond to assertions that citizens and legal aliens may have a reasonable fear that refusing to answer an
agent's questions may result in arrests. Id. at 220-21. Thus, the Court gave the possibility that Delgado
workers feared exercising their right to ignore official questioning short shrift.
Under the Delgado analysis, the LaDuke plaintiffs would not be considered seized when they were
questioned about their identities at their doorsteps. Since the LaDuke plaintiffs were all citizens or legal
aliens, a court might insist that they had no reason to be fearful of seizure or detention when the INS
agents blocked all exits. They were aware, presumably, that their truthful answers to the agents'
questions would prevent seizure or detention. Even if other residents of farm housing, in all likelihood
illegal aliens, were seized when they attempted to flee or evade questioning, the LaDuke plaintiffs,
according to the logic of Delgado, were unaffected. It is unlikely that the questioning of workers at the
entrances of residences, in and of itself, would be classified as a seizure. Justice Rehnquist, the author of
the Delgado opinion, declared as much in an earlier decision. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
222 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. LaDuke, 762 E2d at 1328 & n.13, 1332 n.19.
130. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
131. Exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to arrest, searches compelled
by an exigency (the emergency doctrine), and searches authorized by consent. LaFave, supra note 47, at
§ 4.1(a).
132. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,505 n. 10 (1983). See also Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,
540 F.2d 1062, 1069-70 (7th Cir.), modified on reh'g en banc as to remedy only, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1977) (area control operations that involve late night warrantless searches of living quarters offend
fourth amendment dictates). But see Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-61 ("Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion").
133. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1327 n.12.
134. A warrantless search of a residence under the circumstances of LaDuke might have elicited
censure even from the Delgado Court. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring) ("the
employees' expectation of privacy in the plant setting here, like that in an automobile, certainly is far
less than the traditional expectation of privacy in one's residence").
135. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326.
136. See supra notes 112 & 113; infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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the agents in LaDuke obtained neither the consent of farm owners nor
warrants for searches, 137 their conduct fell below the level acceptable even
for worksite sweeps. 138
The INS's intrusion in LaDuke should not have been sanctioned even if
the consent of farm owners had been obtained. Although, arguably, work-
sites may include some types of owner-supplied quarters, it should not
include farm housing. 139 Farm housing offers exclusivity and privacy to
off-duty workers. It is similar in type to subsidized housing at mine-and
millsites. 140 Indeed, farm housing, in terms of privacy, has more in com-
mon with hotel accommodations furnished business travelers by other
industries. Farm housing occupants, therefore, should be accorded the
same deference that law enforcement officials are required to show to
residents of other dwellings, including residents of hotel rooms. 141
The final factor that sets the LaDuke case apart is the agency's inconsis-
tent directives. The agency's directives prohibited it from making war-
rantless urban residential searches, yet this prohibition was not applicable
to rural residential searches. 42 According to the LaDuke court, however,
the fourth amendment does not permit the INS to accord different levels of
privacy to the occupants of various kinds of housing. 143
B. The LaDuke Result Is Proper
LaDuke reached the proper result based on reasoning more convincing
than that of the much-criticized Delgado. 144 In addition, its requirements
seek to temper the government's enforcement methods by requiring due
137. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1328.
138. The INS agents in Delgado consistently sought warrants or the consent of factory owners
before beginning operations. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
139. It is debatable whether housing furnished by municipalities to on-duty firefighters and by
hospitals to on-duty interns or residents may be considered part of the worksite. Such accommodations
may lack privacy, shift from location to location, offer communal sleeping arrangements, or serve as a
base for a number of individuals sequentially during a twenty-four-hour period.
The better view would be to accord individuals with these arrangements the same fourth amendment
rights that occupants of conventional dwellings enjoy.
140. The occupants of mine or mill housing generally are tenants of mill or mine owners. The
Supreme Court has determined that a search by police of a house occupied by a tenant invades the
tenant's constitutional right, even if the search was authorized by the owner of the property. Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961).
141. "The general rule.., is that a warrantless search of. . . a hotel room, is constitutionally
prohibited." United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
142. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326.
143. Id. at 1326 n. 11. See also supra note 114.
144. Commentators have criticized the Delgado opinion as less than convincing, primarily
because of the Court's ingenuous handling of the seizure question. See Note, Constitutional Law, supra
note 5, at 190; Note, Delgado, supra note 5, at 515; Note, Search and Seizure, supra note 7, at418-21.
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deference to the rights of citizens and legal aliens of Hispanic descent.
LaDuke prohibits searches without probable cause, effective consent, or
warrants.14 5 It also prevents the INS from stopping or detaining farm
housing residents by force, threats of force, or commands based upon
official authority. 146 Residents may be detained only if agents possess valid
warrants, probable cause, or articulable suspicion of illegal alienage. 147
Although the LaDuke requirements may appear more restrictive than
those required under Delgado148 and Martinez-Fuerte, 149 they are prefera-
ble because they promote more racially-neutral law enforcement. The
contemporary interpretation of the fourth amendment, if given its broadest
interpretation, has a tendency to allow the government's interest in curtail-
ing illegal activity to overwhelm the individual's right to privacy and
security. 150 Since the burden of a broad interpretation would fall most
heavily on minority citizens and lawfully-present aliens, it is especially
offensive in immigration enforcement.
The LaDuke decision avoids the pitfall of encroaching upon the civil
rights of Hispanic citizens and legal aliens on the basis of their physical or
racial appearances, 151 or their proximity to suspected illegal aliens. 152
LaDuke preserves the Hispanic citizen's or legal alien's expectation of
privacy. LaDuke guarantees that the occupants of rural residences will
receive treatment that is comparable to that accorded urban residents. In
contrast, the reasoning of Delgado and Martinez-Fuerte permit milieu
145. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 165 & n. 1. The district court prohibitions were affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit. See LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1331.
146. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 165. See also LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1331.
147. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 165.
148. 466 U.S. at 217 & n.5, 218.
149. 428 U.S. at 562-64.
150. The Delgado decision lends itself to the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the fourth
amendment; the LaDuke decision does not necessarily. Although the LaDuke court found a seizure, it
did not balance overtly the government's interest in conducting farm checks against the residents'
interests in privacy and security. With its emphasis on warrants, probable cause, and articulable
suspicion, the LaDuke decision harks back to an earlier time and a different interpretation of the fourth
amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 39-61. On the other hand, the LaDuke result probably
is justifiable even under the balancing approach. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that
residences are accorded a higher degree of protection under the fourth amendment than either
factories-Delgado-or automobiles-Martinez-Fuerte. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217 n.5; Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561.
151. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 234 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Illinois Migrant Council, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976), modified on
reh'g en banc as to remedy only, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977); Cheung Tin Wong v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 468 F.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F Supp. 100, 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Catz, supra note 1, at 67.
152. In fields of law enforcement other than that of immigration, an individual who happens to be
present in premises where a search or arrest warrant is being executed may not, by virtue of that fact
alone, be subjected to a search or arrest. The arrest or search must be supported by probable cause
particularized to that individual. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 92 & n.4 (1979).
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suspicion and suspicion based on ethnicity. Thus, for example, under
Delgado, a Hispanic individual's expectation of privacy in an employment
setting dominated by Hispanics is outweighed by the government's interest
in conducting factory surveys to control illegal immigration. 153
IV. PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING FARM AND
RANCH SURVEYS
Loosely drawn standards in immigration enforcement raise the pos-
sibility that an officer's discretion to harass citizens and legal aliens, who
are members of ethnic minority groups, may be institutionalized. 154 The
standard promulgated in Delgado lends itself to such abuse. Under the
fiction of permitting consensual encounters 155 between INS officers and
factory workers, the court authorized agents to single out citizens and legal
aliens of Hispanic ancestry for repetitive questioning and the consequent
embarassment that results therefrom. 156 LaDuke avoids such unbridled
discretion by imposing a warrant, probable cause, or articulable suspicion
of illegal alienage requirement for similar interrogations at farmworker
residences. LaDuke also prohibits unwarranted searches.
The Commissioner of the INS should promulgate procedures that will
assist agents in implementing the LaDuke standard since the LaDuke
standard avoids unwarranted searches and seizures, eschews milieu suspi-
cion, and is racially neutral in its design. These procedures should include
the following instructions. First, agents should obtain search or arrest
warrants before questioning workers at the doors of farm housing. This
requirement is the same as that imposed on agents conducting urban
surveys; thus, it insures farmworkers residing in rural housing a degree of
privacy equivalent to that enjoyed by urban dwellers, as the LaDuke court
demanded. 157
If an agent discovers during the course of the investigation that the warrant
does not permit the type of police activity that the agent deems necessary,
then the agent should follow the guidelines for warrantless operations.
LaDuke requires that an agent possess probable cause or articulable suspi-
cion of illegal alienage for a warrantless arrest. 158 Warrantless searches are
153. See Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F. Supp. 1278, 1288 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
154. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
155. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
156. See id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. See supra note 114 (court notices differences in rural and urban requirements for searches).
158. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 163. The district court decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. See
LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1331. See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). The INS has a
number of procedures available to it to establish articulable suspicion including: examining enforce-
ment records; interviewing farm owners; employing undercover operations; utilizing informants; and
acting upon tips and leads from other federal agencies. See Individualized Suspicion in Factory
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discouraged under LaDuke, but agents may conduct such a search if they
have probable cause. 159
Second, agents should obtain administrative warrants 160 if they lack the
specific information necessary for search or arrest warrants, but have
reasonable grounds to believe that a substantial number of workers at a
particular farm are undocumented deportable aliens.161 To obtain an ad-
ministrative warrant, agents must demonstrate that a farm probably em-
ploys a large number of illegal aliens, and that no practical alternatives for
conducting a survey exist. 162 Agents may station themselves at harvest
collection points 163 or at other appropriate locations to check items of
identification for all workers. This procedure does not allow questioning at
the workers' residences; nor does it allow the singling out of workers by
their ethnic appearances. It is less desirable, however, than the preceding
one because of its potential for the harassment of minorities. It, therefore,
should be used only if agents lack the specific information required for
search warrants, but nevertheless have substantial information that illegal
aliens are present at a particular farm. The Commissioner of the INS should
establish the standards for issuance of such warrants.
These procedures reject a possible reading of Delgado that an individ-
ual's responses to police questioning always constitute a consensual en-
counter. 164 Unless initiated by the citizen, police-citizen encounters are
likely to be viewed by citizens as adversarial since such questioning implies
official suspicion. Thus, the requirements imposed on agents should be
consistent with the public's general expectations of police conduct. These
procedures also forestall the conduct repudiated in LaDuke. They prevent
rural and urban residents from being accorded different treatment. They
require that agents establish the credibility of their informants before acting
on tips. They prohibit agents from harassing individuals based on their
alleged proximity to illegal aliens. They also restrict the discretion of
individual officers to conduct searches and seizures.
Searches-"The Least Intrusive Alternative," 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 403, 421 & n. 144, 422 (1984).
159. LaDuke, 560 F. Supp. at 165. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. See
LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1331. Two of the general exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches are
synonymous with probable cause-searches incident to arrest and searches induced by an exigency (the
emergency doctrine). See supra note 141.
160. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrants can be issued in
accordance with administrative standards, a lesser standard than probable cause).
161. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Most migrant farm workers are present to harvest rather than to cultivate. Thus, workers could
be questioned at the harvest collection points where their wages are determined.
164. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
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V. CONCLUSION
Successful curtailment of illegal immigration requires that the executive
and legislative branches of government resolve two elements of the prob-
lem: the location and deportation of illegal aliens, and the deterrence of
potential illegal immigrants. The LaDuke standard assists the INS with the
first element.
The LaDuke standard assumes special importance where effective deter-
rents to illegal immigration have not been instituted since the government
must rely solely on its skill in locating and deporting illegal aliens. The
LaDuke standard protects the rights of citizens and lawfully present aliens
of ethnic or racial minority groups by predicating official intrusion only
upon attainment of a specific level of suspicion. The LaDuke standard also
insures that farmworkers furnished rural housing will be treated no less
respectfully than those furnished urban or suburban housing. Finally, the
LaDuke standard avoids milieu suspicion.
If, instead, the holdings of Delgado and Martinez-Fuerte are given their
broadest interpretations, the rights of citizens and legal aliens of ethnic or
racial minority groups will be sacrificed. The government's interest in
curtailing illegal immigration is almost certain to prevail if balanced
against the privacy rights of individuals. When it does, immigration
officials, uninhibited by any objective standards and, therefore, free to stop
and search any individuals without explanation or excuse, will likely target
individuals by their racial or ethnic appearances. The effect of standardless
searches and seizures is to deprive citizens and legal resident aliens with
particular racial or ethnic characteristics of their right to be free from
unwarranted official harassment.
Since the INS is likely to use its current methods for the foreseeable
future, it is important that the INS adopt procedures like those proposed in
this Note to ensure that the rights of all citizens and legal aliens are
protected.
Congress and the executive branch have numerous methods of dealing
with illegal immigration. Even though those selected have not been particu-
larly successful, courts should resist the temptation to ease the tasks of the
other branches of government by weakening constitutional protections of
citizens and legal aliens under the fourth amendment.
Barbara J. Selberg
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